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Abstract. Concurrent signature, introduced by Chen, Kudla and Paterson, is known to just
fall short to solve the long standing fair exchange of signature problem without requiring any
trusted third party (TTP). The price for not requiring any TTP is that the initial signer is
always having some advantage over the matching signer in controlling whether the protocol
completes or not, and hence, whether the two ambiguous signatures will bind concurrently
to their true signers or not. In this paper, we examine the notion and classify the advantages
of the initial signer into three levels, some of which but not all of them may be known in
the literature.
– Advantage level 0 is the commonly acknowledged fact that concurrent signature is not
abuse-free since an initial signer who holds a keystone can always choose to complete or
abort a concurrent signature protocol run by deciding whether to release the keystone
or not.
– Advantage level 1 refers to the fact that the initial signer can convince a third party that
both ambiguous signatures are valid without actually making the signatures publicly
veriﬁable.
– Advantage level 2 allows the initial signer to convince a third party that the matching
signer agrees to commit to a speciﬁc message, and nothing else. We stress that advantage
level 2 is not about proving the possession of a keystone. Proving the knowledge of a
keystone would make the malicious initial signer accountable as this could only be done
by the initial signer.
We remark that the original security models for concurrent signature do not rule out the
aforementioned advantages of the initial signer. Indeed, we show that theoretically, the
initial signer always enjoys the above advantages for any concurrent signatures. Our work
demonstrates a clear gap between the notion of concurrent signature and optimistic fair
exchange (OFE) in which no party enjoys advantage level 1. Furthermore, in a variant
known as Ambiguous OFE, no party enjoys advantage level 1 and 2.
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Introduction

Fair exchange of digital signatures has been considered as a fundamental problem in cryptography. It is a useful cryptographic protocol that allows secure and fair e-commerce applications to
exchange digital signatures for legal contracts or agreements. Nowadays, goods and services are
being exchanged electronically over the Internet. Our main goal is to ensure that the exchanges
are fair, which means that at the end of an exchange between two parties, either both parties
receive the complete items or none of them obtains anything.
Fairness in exchanging signatures is normally achieved with the help of a trusted third party
(TTP), which is often oﬄine. There were several attempts where a fair exchange of signatures
can be achieved with a “semi-trusted” TTP who can be called upon to handle disputes between
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signers [2]. This type of fair exchanges is also referred to as an optimistic fair exchange (OFE) [3,4].
A well-known open problem in fair exchange is the requirement of a dispute resolving TTP whose
role cannot be replaced by a normal certiﬁcation authority.
In Eurocrypt 2004 [6], Chen, Kudla and Paterson presented a new cryptographic primitive
called “concurrent signature” to allow two parties to produce two ambiguous signatures, such that
both signatures do not bind to their true signers. Upon the release of the signatures, any third
party cannot identify the true signer who generated the signature. However, upon the release of an
extra piece of information called the keystone, both signatures will bind concurrently. The merit
of concurrent signature relies on the fact that there is no TTP required. This has been considered
to be very practical, and hence, concurrent signatures have been promising to be adopted in
practice (c.f. OFE where the need for a TTP may not exist in the real scenario). The demand
of requiring a TTP in cryptographic schemes has made cryptographic schemes less attractive for
adoption in practice, and hence, concurrent signatures have been very promising in bridging the gap
between theoreticians and practitioners. Further, Chen, Kudla and Paterson presented a concrete
concurrent signature scheme based on a variant of Schnorr based ring signature scheme [1]. In
their scheme, any third party cannot be convinced that a signature has indeed been signed by one
particular signer, since any signer can always generate this signature by himself/herself.
In a concurrent signature protocol run, there are two parties involved, namely Alice and Bob
(or A and B, respectively). Since one party is required to create a keystone and sends the ﬁrst
message to the other party, we call this party as the initial signer. A party who responds to
the initial signature by creating another signature is called a matching signer. Without losing
generality, throughout this paper, we assume that Alice (or A, resp.) is the initial signer and Bob
(or B, resp.) is the matching signer.
It is acknowledged that concurrent signature is not perfectly fair, since Alice is in control of the
time at which the keystone is released and thus, control when the ambiguous signatures become
binding to their respective signers. Alice can even decide not to complete a concurrent signature
protocol run if Alice decided not to to release the keystone ultimately. Nonetheless, the concept
of fairness in a concurrent signature is deﬁned as follows: “once Alice releases the keystone, both
ambiguous signatures from Alice and Bob binds concurrently”. Speciﬁcally, it is required that
Alice cannot output a maliciously crafted keystone so that the ambiguous signature from Bob
together with this keystone passes the veriﬁcation algorithm, yet veriﬁcation of the ambiguous
signature created by Alice (perhaps also maliciously) together with this keystone would output
failure. We call this deﬁnition of fairness a “white-box” guarantee, as the malicious Alice is required
to convert the ambiguous signature corresponding to Bob to a “well-formed” publicly veriﬁable
signature under Bob to be considered successful. This is possibly suﬃcient for legal contract signing
purpose, since the contract is only valid if and only if a “well-formed” signature is present. This
deﬁnition is adopted in Chen et al.’s paper and the subsequent works.
1.1

Fairness in Practice

In this paper, we make the observation that the formal deﬁnition of fairness does not necessarily
capture the fairness in practice completely. For example, there is no guarantee that Alice could
not convince a third party Carol that Bob has signed a message, MB , that is, committed to MB ,
without revealing the keystone. We identify that a malicious initial signer may enjoy three levels
of advantages in concurrent signature.
(a) Level 0 advantage is inherent in concurrent signature. The initial signer can always choose to
abort or complete a concurrent signature protocol run.
(b) Level 1 advantage allows the initial signer to demonstrate the fact that he/she is capable of
making both signatures valid if he/she wanted to, without actually making both signatures
publicly veriﬁable.
(c) Level 2 advantage allows the initial signer to convince a third party that the matching signer
has agreed to committed to a certain message, for example, MB , without revealing anything
else.
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These advantage levels have concrete implications regarding the use of concurrent signatures
in practical scenarios. As discussed by Chen et al. in their seminal paper [6], it is very often the
case that the matching signer would not mind sacriﬁcing level 0 advantage. However, regarding
level 1 and 2 advantages, concurrent signatures may not be suitable in some other scenarios such
as tendering systems (c.f. [6] as we will show with details in the later part of this paper). On the
other hand, contrary to the common belief that concurrent signature is applicable to tendering
systems (such as [6, 17, 18]), level 1 advantage to a malicious initial signer could be unacceptable
to some of the suppliers. Hence, in those scenarios, the OFE [2–4, 7] or Ambiguous OFE [10–12]
systems are indeed more suitable compared to concurrent signatures.

1.2

Our Contributions

Firstly, we show that any constructions of concurrent signature following Chen, Kudla and Peterson is always subject to abuse by the initial signer, with advantage level 1 and 2, in addition to the
commonly acknowledged advantage level 0. We present generic methods that allow a malicious
initial signer to convince any third party that he/she has the ability to make both signatures
veriﬁable (level 1), or that the matching signer has committed to his message (level 2). Secondly,
we examine one variant of concurrent signatures, namely, asymmetric concurrent signature [13]
and demonstrate how a malicious initial signer can exhibit his/her level 1 advantage in an eﬀective
manner. Our attack is practical and its implication may discourage the adoption of concurrent
signatures in some application scenarios, and particularly, when it is undesirable to allow a malicious initial signer to convince anyone of the binding of the matching signer’s signature without
making the signature publicly veriﬁable.

1.3

Related Work

Following the seminal work by Chen et al., many subsequent concurrent signature schemes have
been proposed (such as [13, 14, 16, 17]). Nguyen [13] proposed an interesting variant that embraces
the asymmetric property of concurrent signatures (c.f. the symmetric property of all the previously known concurrent signature schemes). Furthermore, Nguyen noted that the construction
techniques of an asymmetric concurrent signature scheme can be used for constructing a multiparty concurrent signature scheme, which is the solution to the open problem stated in Chen et
al.’s seminal work [6]. Subsequently, Tonien, Susilo and Safavi-Naini [16] proposed a multi-party
concurrent signature scheme that uses a diﬀerent model from the construction achieved from [13].
In an orthogonal direction, Susilo, Mu and Zhang [14] investigated the privacy issue in concurrent signatures. They observed that prior the release of a keystone, and just from the two
ambiguous signatures, any third party can already conclude that the two ambiguous signatures
must be created by these two possible signers. At the same time, if the possible signers are believed
to be honest, the outsider can already tell who the actual signer is corresponding to each ambiguous
signature. They then introduced a stronger requirement called perfect ambiguity, which requires
the ambiguous signatures to remain “ambiguous” even if the two potential signers are known to
be honest. Unfortunately, their scheme is shown to be insecure by Wang, Bao and Zhou [17], and
subsequently, Wang et al. proposed a modiﬁed scheme that is proven secure under this stronger
notion.
Yuen, Wong, Susilo and Huang [18] constructed a concurrent signature variant that supports
negotiation between the initial signer and the matching signer on who will control the ﬁnal binding of the ambiguous signatures. They showed that their model is compatible with the original
deﬁnition by Chen et al. [6].
Very recently, Tan, Huang and Wong [15] presented the ﬁrst concurrent signature scheme that
is based on the standard assumption. Their ambiguity model is very similar to the one proposed
by Yuen et al. [18].
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1.4

Roadmap

In the next section, we review the notion of concurrent signatures due to Chen et al. and the
notations used in the rest of this paper. In Section 3, we present our classiﬁcation of advantage
levels to the initial signer in detail, discuss their implications and present generic techniques which
allows the initial signer to enjoy these advantages. In Section 4, we show how an initial signer
can enjoy level 1 advantage in the asymmetric concurrent signature scheme due to Nguyen [13].
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.

2
2.1

Notions and Deﬁnitions of Concurrent Signature
Notations

For a ﬁnite set S, we will denote by x ∈R S the operation of selecting an element x uniformly at
random from S. If p is a positive integer, we use ZZp to denote the set {0, . . . , p − 1}.
2.2

Concurrent Signatures

In the following, we review the deﬁnition of concurrent signatures from [6]. A concurrent signature
comprises four algorithms (SETUP, ASIGN, AVERIFY, VERIFY). Their formal deﬁnitions are given
below.
SETUP. On input security parameter 1λ , this probabilistic algorithm outputs the description of
the set of participants U , the message space M, the signature space S, the keystone space K,
the keystone ﬁx space F, and a function KGEN : K → F. It is also assumed the public keys
{Xi } and their respective secret keys {xi } are also generated by this algorithm. We use π to
denote additional system parameters. We assume (π, U , M, S, K, F, KGEN, {Xi }) are available
to all participants while each user retain his/her own secret key xi .
ASIGN. On input (Xi , Xj , xi , h2 , M ) where Xi , Xj ∈ {Xi } such that Xi = Xj , xi being the secret
key corresponds to the public key Xi , h2 ∈ F, M ∈ M, this algorithm outputs an ambiguous
signature σ = (s, h1 , h2 ) on message M , where s ∈ S, h1 , h2 ∈ F.
AVERIFY. On input (σ, Xi , Xj , M ), where σ = (s, h1 , h2 ), s ∈ S, h1 , h2 ∈ F, Xi , Xj are distinct
public keys and M ∈ M, outputs 0/1. It is required that AVERIFY((s, h1 , h2 ), Xi , Xj , M ) =
AVERIFY((s, h2 , h1 ), Xj , Xi , M ).
VERIFY. On input (k, (σ, Xi , Xj , M )) such that k ∈ K and σ = (s, h1 , h2 ), it outputs 0 if h2 =
KGEN(k). Otherwise, it outputs AVERIFY(σ, Xi , Xj , M ).
Below is a recap of the interactive protocol in which the above algorithms are used in the
exchange of signatures in a concurrent manner amongst two participants.
1. We assume SETUP has been executed and all participants have their own key pair already.
Below we describe how Alice with key pair (XA , xA ) exchanges signatures with Bob with key
pair (XB , xB ).
2. Alice picks a random k ∈ K, computes f = KGEN(k) and obtains σA := (sA , hA , f ) from
ASIGN(XA , XB , xA , f, MA ). Alice sends σA , MA to Bob.
3. Bob veriﬁes Alice’s ambiguous signature by invoking AVERIFY(σA , XA , XB , MA ). If σA is
valid, Bob obtains σB := (sB , hB , f ) from ASIGN(XB , XA , xB , f, MB ). Bob sends (σB , MB )
to Alice.
4. Alice veriﬁes Bob’s ambiguous signature by invoking AVERIFY(σB , XB , XA , MB ). If σB is valid,
Alice releases the keystone k. Parse SA as (k, σA , XA , XB , MA ) and SB as (k, σB , XB , XA , MB ).
5. Everybody can now verify both signatures SA and SB using VERIFY.
The correctness is deﬁned in the usual manner. Speciﬁcally, if σ = ASIGN(Xi , Xj , xi , f , M )
and S = (k, σ, Xi , Xj , M ), then AVERIFY(σ, Xi , Xj , M ) = 1. In addition, if f = KGEN(k) for
some k ∈ K, then VERIFY(S) = 1.
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Security Model

As discussed in [6], a concurrent signature should satisfy three security requirements, namely,
unforgeability, ambiguity and fairness. For completeness, we review these security requirements as
follows.
Unforgeability The following game is used to capture the existential unforgeability of a concurrent signature.
Deﬁnition 1 (Unforgeability). A concurrent signature is unforgeable if no PPT adversary A
can win the following game with a challenger C.
Setup. C invokes SETUP(1λ ) for a security parameter 1λ and obtains a set of parameters (π, U , M,
S, K, F, KGEN, {Xi }) and the corresponding set of secret keys {xi }. C gives the set of parameters to A while retaining the set of secret keys {xi }.
Queries. A is allowed to issue to following queries in an adaptive manner.
1. KGEN: C randomly generates k ∈R K and returns f = KGEN(k) to A.
2. Keystone Reveal: On input f such that f is an output of the KGEN query, C returns k
such that f = KGEN(k). Otherwise C returns ⊥.
3. ASIGN: On input (Xi , Xj , h2 , M ) such that Xi , Xj ∈ {Xi }, h2 ∈ F, M ∈ M, C replies
with ASIGN(Xi , Xj , xi , h2 , M ).
4. Secret Key Reveal: On input Xi ∈ {Xi }, C returns xi .
Output. Finally A outputs a signature σ ∗ = (s∗ , h∗ , f ∗ ), a message M ∗ and two public keys Xc∗ ,
Xd∗ . A wins the game if AVERIFY(σ ∗ , Xc∗ , Xd∗ , M ∗ = 1) and either one of the following is true:
– (Xc∗ , Xd∗ , f ∗ , M ∗ ) is not an input to the ASIGN query and Xc∗ , Xd∗ is not an input to the
secret key reveal query.
– A has not made any ASIGN query of the form (Xc∗ , X, f ∗ , M ∗ ) for all X ∈ {Xi } \ {Xc∗ },
no secret key reveal query was made with input Xc∗ and f ∗ is the output of KGEN query
or A also outputs k ∗ such that f ∗ = KGEN(k ∗ ).
Ambiguity The following game is used to capture ambiguity of a concurrent signature.
Deﬁnition 2 (Ambiguity). A concurrent signature is ambiguous if no PPT adversary A can
win the following game with a challenger C.
Setup. Same as Setup in the game in Deﬁnition 1.
Phase 1. A is allowed to made a sequence of KGEN, Keystone Reveal, ASIGN and Secret Key
Reveal query, which are answered as in the game of subsection 2.3.
Challenge. A outputs two public keys Xi , Xj and a message M as challenge. C randomly picks
k ∈R K and computes f = KGEN(k). C then ﬂips a fair coin b ∈R {0, 1}. If b = 0, C computes
σ0 = ASIGN(Xi , Xj , xi , f, M ). Otherwise, C computes (s, h, f ) = ASIGN(Xj , Xi , xj , f, M ) and
parse σ1 as (s, f, h). C returns σb to A.
Phase 2. A can make another sequence of queries as in phase 1.
Output. Finally A outputs a guess bit b . A wins the game if b = b and A did not make any
Keystone Reveal query on input f or h.
Fairness The following game is used to capture fairness of a concurrent signature.
Deﬁnition 3 (Fairness). A concurrent signature is fair if no PPT adversary A can win the
following game with a challenger C.
Setup. Same as Setup in the game of subsection 2.3
Queries. A is allowed to made a sequence of KGEN, Keystone Reveal, ASIGN and Secret Key
Reveal query, which are answered as in the game of subsection 2.3.
Challenge. A outputs two public keys Xi , Xj and two messages Mi , Mj , together with σi =
(si , h1 , h2 ) such that AVERIFY((si , h1 , h2 ), Xi , Xj , Mi ) = 1. C returns σj = (sj , h3 , h2 ) =
ASIGN(Xj , Xi , xj , h2 , Mj ).
Output. Finally A either outputs a value k. A wins the game if f = KGEN(k) such that f was a
previous output from KGEN query and no Keystone Reveal query on f was made.
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Abusing Fairness in Concurrent Signatures

In this section, we discuss the various advantage levels enjoyed by the initial signer, their implications and how they could be acquired. At the high level, it is often the case that exhibiting such
advantage requires the use of zero-knowledge proof [9], which is reviewed as follows.
3.1

Zero-Knowledge Proof

A zero-knowledge proof [9] is an interactive protocol for one party, the prover, to prove to another
party, the veriﬁer, that some statement is true, without revealing anything other than the veracity
of the statement. In [8], it has been shown that, assuming the existence of one-way function, one
can create a zero-knowledge proof system for the NP-complete graph coloring problem with three
colors. Since every problem in NP can be eﬃciently reduced to this problem, it means that all
problems in NP have zero-knowledge proofs. Later in [5], it has been shown that anything that
can be proved by an interactive proof system can be proved with zero knowledge.
3.2

Advantage Level 0

Level 0 advantage is inherent in concurrent signatures, as the initial signer, Alice, is in possession
of the keystone, which is under the full control of Alice on when and whether the keystone will
be released to the public. Thus, the primitive is not suitable if the matching signer will be at a
disadvantage if withholding the keystone or delaying the release of the keystone would cause harm
to the matching signer.
The Implications. Consider the tendering systems as discussed in the seminal paper of Chen
et al. [6]. They described a scenario where A has a bridge-building contract that she would like
to put out to tender. Suppose there are two companies B and C that wish to put in proposals to
win this contract. In this scenario, B acts as the initial signer, as this is to prohibit A to show
this contract to C to get a better proposal from C. We note that in this particular scenario, B
has the full control of the keystone, since the keystone is selected by B. Therefore, if at the end
of the tender, if A would like to select B as the winner of the tender, B may still have the liberty
for not completing the contract by not releasing the keystone, and hence, it is unfair to A.
3.3

Advantage Level 1

The Abuse. Assume Alice is a malicious initial signer, whose purpose is to convince a third party
Carol that the matching signer Bob and herself are about to exchange signatures on messages MA
and MB . Assume Alice and Bob have completed step 3 of the concurrent signature protocol
(as described in Section 2.2). That is, Alice is in possession of a keystone k and the ambiguous
signature from Bob σB := (sB , hB , f ) on message MB . At the same time, Bob is in possession of
Alice’s ambiguous signature σA := (sA , hA , f ) on message MA . In our generic attack, Alice reveals
σA , σB , MA , MB to Carol and then conducts a zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of the value k
with Carol such that
f = KGEN(k).
Carol is convinced that Alice and Bob are exchanging signatures on messages MA and MB and
that Alice has the ability to complete the transaction.
The Implications. Consider an open auction [17, 18] in which Alice’s ambiguous signature is a
contract to sell a certain goods while Bob’s ambiguous signature is a contract of a bid. Level-1
advantage allows Alice to convince Carol that she has the ability to seal the contract with Bob
and the bid is speciﬁed in MB . This allows Alice to safely urge Carol for a higher bid, and Bob is
at a disadvantage.
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We note that this implication is also applicable to the tendering systems as discussed previously.
However, in this scenario, let us consider the case where A, who would like to put the bridgebuilding tender, is the initial signer. Hence, the company B and C will act as the matching
signers. In this setting, A will take the advantage level 1 to convince C about B’s tender, so that
C will increase the value of her tender, and hence, disadvantaging B.
3.4

Advantage Level 2

The Abuse. Assume Alice is a malicious initial signer, whose purpose is to convince a third
party Carol that the matching signer Bob has committed to message MB . Assume Alice and
Bob have completed step 3 of the concurrent signature protocol (as described in Section 2.2).
That is, Alice is in possession of a keystone k and the ambiguous signature from Bob σB :=
(sB , hB , f ) on message MB . At the same time, Bob is in possession of Alice’s ambiguous signature
σA := (sA , hA , f ) on message MA . Our observation on the incompleteness of the original fairness
deﬁnition in [6] arises from the fact that to convince Carol about Bob’s commitment to MB does
not necessarily involve outputting some maliciously crafted keystone k̂. Speciﬁcally, in our generic
attack, Alice conducts a zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of the tuple (k, σB ) with Carol such
that the following statements are true:
1. f = KGEN(k), and
2. AVERIFY(σB , XA , XB , MB ) = 1.
This would be suﬃcient to convince a third party about Bob’s intention to sign a message MB ,
without revealing anything about Alice’s intention, thus undermining the fairness guarantees of
the concurrent signature schemes, and put Bob into disadvantage.
The Implications. Note that in the zero-knowledge proof, Alice does not reveal the keystone
k, the keystone ﬁx f , nor Bob’s ambiguous signature. Thus, even if Carol is presented with the
secret key of Bob, the ambiguous signatures σA and σB from Bob, she could not conclude that
Alice has committed to MA . In other words, the only thing that Carol can be assured of is that
Alice is in possession of a signature from Bob on message MB . Bob is left at an unfair position.
We would like to remark that both level 1 and 2 advantages are outside the security deﬁnition
presented in Section 2.3. We also do not claim that existing concurrent signature schemes are
broken for two reasons. Firstly, they are not within the security model. Secondly, even though
they are theoretically possible, it is not always feasible. Thus, people should bear in mind any
concurrent signature following this syntax could be abused by the initial signer, and hence, the
adoption of concurrent signatures in application scenario should be examined to make sure that
either the level 1 and 2 advantages of the initial signer are acceptable or that the advantages
cannot be claimed eﬃciently.

4

Abusing Fairness in Asymmetric Concurrent Signatures

In this section, we demonstrate a practical abuse in advantage level 1 of the asymmetric concurrent
signature due to Nguyen [13]. In this abuse, the initial signer can convince any veriﬁer that he/she
has the ability to make both ambiguous signatures veriﬁable. We would like to stress again that
the attack is outside their original model and we therefore do not claim that we break Nguyen’s
original scheme.
4.1

Review of Nguyen’s asymmetric concurrent signatures

For completeness, we will ﬁrst review Nguyen’s scheme.
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Setup. Let G = g be a group of prime order p. The key pair of Alice and Bob are respectively
(XA = g xA , xA ) ∈ G × ZZp , (XB = g xB , xB ) ∈ G × ZZp . Let H : G × {0, 1}∗ → ZZp be a hash
function that would be modeled as random oracle.
Generation of Alice’s ambiguous signature. On input a message MA ∈ {0, 1}∗ and Bob’s public
key XB , Alice randomly generates r ∈R ZZp and computes c = H(g r , MA ), s = g r+cxA .
Alice sets her ambiguous signature as (c, s) and sends it to Bob. The keystone is deﬁned as
k = r + cxA such that s = g k .
Generation of Bob’s ambiguous signature. On input a message MB ∈ {0, 1}∗ and an ambiguous
−c
, MA ). Bob continues
signature (c, s) on message MA from Alice, Bob ﬁrst check if c = H(sXA




xB

 r
if the check is successful. He computes s = s , c = H(s g , MB ) and k  = r x−c
. He sets his
B
ambiguous signature as (c , s , k  ) and sends it to Alice.
Binding of both signatures. Upon receiving (c , s , k  ) from Bob, Alice ﬁrst checks if




k 
s , MB )
c = H(g c XB
k
and s = XB
. If the check is successful and if Alice decides to have both signatures binded,
she releases the value k. Both signatures are now publicly veriﬁable by checking the following
veriﬁcation equations.

Veriﬁcation of Alice’s signature:
?

?

−c
c = H(XA
s, MA ) ∧ s = g k
Veriﬁcation of Bob’s signature:
?





?

k 
k
c = H(g c XB
s , MB ) ∧ s = XB

Remark. Nguyen’s construction is asymmetric in the sense that Alice’s signature and Bob’s
signature are of diﬀerent form with diﬀerent veriﬁcation equations.
4.2

A Concrete Level-1 Abuse on Nguyen’s Scheme

Given the pair of ambiguous signatures (c, s), (c , s , k  ) on message MA and MB respectively,
k
can
Alice, who is in possession of the keystone k satisfying the relationship s = g k and s = XB
convince a third party Carol that she has the ability to bind both ambiguous signatures by proving
she knows the value k in zero-knowledge. The full proof protocol is shown below.
1. Alice sends both (c, s), (c , s , k  ) MA , MB to Carol.

−c
k 
2. Carol checks c = H(XA
s, MA ) and c = H(g c XB
s , MB ). If yes, she randomly generates two
t1 t2
values t1 , t2 ∈R ZZp and sends T0 = g h to Alice.
t
and sends T1 , T2 to
3. Alice randomly generates a value t ∈R ZZp , computes T1 = g t , T2 = XB
Carol.
4. Carol sends t1 , t2 to Alice
5. Alice checks if T0 = g t1 ht2 . If yes, she computes z = t − t1 k and sends z to Carol.
t
z
and accepts the the proof if both equations hold.
6. Carol checks if T1 = st1 g z and T2 = s 1 XB

5

Conclusion

We pointed out the advantage gained by the initial signer in a concurrent signature scheme, and
classiﬁed into three levels. In fact, any concurrent signature satisfying Chen, Kudla and Paterson’s
syntax can be abused in diﬀerent ways. This is a very important observation in particular where
concurrent signatures are used in diﬀerent scenarios. Cautions must be exercised when concurrent
signatures are to be adopted in real applications to ensure either the matching signer can accept
the inherent unfairness of concurrent signatures or it is hard for the initial signer to claim the
advantage. In particular, we demonstrated that concurrent signatures are not suitable for tendering
systems (in contrast to the seminal paper of Chen et al. [6]).
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